What is the Likelihood of Being Heard? An Examination of the Relationship Between Decentralization, Strength in Indigenous Movements, and Meaningful Consultation with Indigenous Groups in Latin America by Bromfield, Brittany M.
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Political Science Theses Department of Political Science
8-11-2015
What is the Likelihood of Being Heard? An
Examination of the Relationship Between
Decentralization, Strength in Indigenous
Movements, and Meaningful Consultation with
Indigenous Groups in Latin America
Brittany M. Bromfield
Georgia State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Science at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Political Science Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bromfield, Brittany M., "What is the Likelihood of Being Heard? An Examination of the Relationship Between Decentralization,
Strength in Indigenous Movements, and Meaningful Consultation with Indigenous Groups in Latin America." Thesis, Georgia State
University, 2015.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses/64
  
WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING HEARD? 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DECENTRALIZATION, 
STRENGTH IN INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS, AND MEANINGFUL CONSULTATION 
WITH INDIGENOUS GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA. 
by: 
 
BRITTANY BROMFIELD 
 
Under the Direction of Jennifer McCoy, PhD 
 
ABSTRACT 
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1 INTRODUCTION Reports	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  environmental	  rights	  abuses	  targeted	  at	  indigenous	  groups	  abound	  in	  Latin	  America.	  Many	  of	  these	  stem	  from	  multinational	  corporation	  and	  central	  government	  negligence	  in	  protecting	  indigenous	  territorial	  rights.	  Curiously,	  there	  are	  provisions	  in	  Latin	  American	  constitutions	  that	  protect	  indigenous	  communities	  and	  territories.	  However,	  indigenous	  rights	  abuses	  perpetrated	  by	  multinational	  corporations	  operating	  in	  the	  host	  country	  and	  tolerated	  by	  governments	  continue	  to	  be	  reported.	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  look	  at	  how	  the	  governments	  of	  some	  Latin	  American	  countries,	  specifically	  in	  Bolivia,	  Ecuador,	  and	  Brazil,	  respond	  to	  those	  abuses.	  I	  seek	  to	  understand	  why	  some	  governments	  step	  in	  to	  protect	  indigenous	  rights	  or	  why	  they	  ignore	  them.	  	  	  
1.1 Gap in the Literature and How I Resolve It: Upon	  doing	  the	  preliminary	  research	  for	  this	  research	  proposal,	  I	  have	  found	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  in	  addressing	  why	  and	  how	  some	  Latin	  American	  governments	  allow	  these	  indigenous	  rights	  abuses	  to	  go	  ignored	  or	  unpunished.	  Very	  little	  existing	  literature	  adequately	  addresses	  when	  indigenous	  rights	  abuses	  go	  unpunished,	  especially	  when	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America	  have	  decentralized	  and	  their	  constitutions	  have	  recognized	  indigenous	  land	  and	  cultural	  rights.	  I	  examine	  the	  trends	  of	  indigenous	  rights	  abuses	  and	  under	  what	  conditions	  indigenous	  groups	  become	  successful	  in	  combating	  or	  even	  preventing	  these	  abuses.	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1.2 My Argument: 	  	   I	  examine	  political,	  legal,	  and	  economic	  factors	  that	  improve	  government	  respect	  for	  indigenous	  property	  rights	  in	  Latin	  America.	  Specifically,	  I	  argue	  that	  Latin	  American	  governments	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  respect	  indigenous	  rights	  when	  economic	  autonomy	  is	  high,	  when	  pro-­‐indigenous	  ideology	  is	  present,	  and	  when	  indigenous	  groups	  are	  strong.	  	  
First,	  economic	  autonomy	  is	  important	  because	  it	  allows	  for	  national	  governments	  to	  make	  economic	  decisions	  more	  independently	  without	  the	  fear	  of	  breaking	  agreements	  with	  their	  international	  lenders.	  Second,	  indigenous	  groups	  need	  to	  be	  numerous,	  strong,	  and	  strategic	  to	  improve	  their	  representation	  in	  politics	  (concepts	  of	  “strength”	  and	  “strategy”	  to	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  paper).	  	  If	  an	  indigenous	  population	  is	  too	  small	  and	  disorganized,	  they	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  represented	  in	  policy	  decisions.	  Lastly,	  a	  state’s	  constitution	  needs	  to	  recognize	  indigenous	  people	  as	  citizens	  with	  cultural	  and	  legal	  rights.	  The	  more	  official	  recognition	  in	  the	  constitution,	  the	  more	  pro-­‐indigenous	  a	  state	  is	  with	  rights	  to	  prior,	  meaningful	  consultations.	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  all	  of	  these	  factors	  are	  critical	  in	  impacting	  whether	  or	  not	  Latin	  American	  governments	  respect	  indigenous	  land	  rights	  by	  holding	  meaningful	  consultations	  with	  indigenous	  groups.	  The	  project	  examines	  resource	  extraction	  in	  three	  cases-­‐	  Bolivia,	  Ecuador,	  and	  Brazil-­‐	  to	  identify	  patterns	  of	  abuse	  or	  respect	  of	  indigenous	  rights	  and	  to	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  the	  proposed	  variables	  in	  explaining	  those	  outcomes.	  
1.3  The Decentralization Puzzle and How Indigenous People Do Not Benefit From 
Decentralization Policies 	   Why are decentralized governments significant to national economic development and 
indigenous strength? Decentralization may mean more representation for local citizens and more 
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political and fiscal control for local governments. According to the literature, there are several 
types of decentralization: administrative, political, and fiscal (Treisman, 2007).  Administrative 
decentralization is defined as a system in which “at least one policy is implemented not by the 
central government directly but by locally based agents.” Political decentralization is a system in 
which “at least one subnational tier of government has exclusive authority to make decisions on 
at least one policy issue,” and fiscal decentralization entails subnational governments accounting 
for a “large share of total government revenues or spending/decision-making on tax or 
expenditure issues” (Treisman, 2007, 28).   
Hankla, Ponce Rodriguez, et al. (2014) theorize decentralization in another way. They 
break down decentralization into two main categories: whether a state is “democratically 
decentralized,” that is, if they have democratically elected subnational governments; or if the 
state is “party decentralized”, that is, if “the national leaders lack the power to select candidates 
for these sub-national elections.” Both Treisman (2007) and Hankla, et al. (2014) find that 
decentralization does not automatically mean that perfect representation and control in local 
political control. Levine and Molina (2011) explain why Mexico’s federal government is not able 
to combat violence and corruption caused by drug cartels despite the Mexican government being 
fiscally decentralized but not having an efficient politically decentralized system. They argue 
that “decentralization reforms that gave state and local governments more power of the purse 
without strengthening key governing institutions are partly to blame for this situation” (Levine 
and Molina, 2011, 98).  
Of course, many factors determine the success of local municipalities. For example, in 
countries that are democratically decentralized and party centralized, “national leaders have 
significant powers, not the least nomination powers over sub-national politicians, and therefore, 
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can push them to optimally supply these goods” (11).  This could mean that national 
governments in Latin America could dictate what policies local governments implement.  
 
1.3.1 Limits to Decentralization Policies and How It Influences Indigenous Political 
Access 
Literature on Bolivia suggest that since Bolivia’s decentralization reforms began in the 
1990s, accountability and responsiveness at the local level, and in particular in rural areas, has 
improved and encouraged local participation among indigenous groups, resulting in more 
representation (Levine and Molina, 2011, 159). 
With regard to fiscal decentralization, local governments also need to have a certain level 
of autonomy to represent local citizens. In a Woodrow Wilson Center Report on the Americas by 
Joseph Tulchin and Andrew Selee (2004), being highly dependent on national fiscal transfers “is 
said to reduce” the degree of autonomy that subnational governments have to set policy” (16). 
Tulchin and Selee go on to give the example that in “Mexico most federal transfers to states 
come with significant strings attached.” What can explain the link between decentralization and 
likelihood of governments to adhere to indigenous land rights?   
 Some multinational corporations can indeed have a positive relationship with indigenous 
groups, provided that local governments and indigenous groups actually have a say in when, 
where, and how MNCs can use their land without the expense of local indigenous communities.  
According to Gerald P. Neugebauer’s 2003 article “ Indigenous Peoples as Stakeholders”,  
“direct contact as a stakeholder emphasizes-in terms easily grasped by the corporate mentality-
how much petroleum development impacts indigenous communities and consequently informs 
corporations why it is in their best long-term interest to take the indigenous perspective into 
account when making resource-management decisions.” 
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When indigenous people speak up and take an active role in exercising their human rights 
and property rights in defining how MNCs can use their land, there tends to be less conflict and 
property rights abuses against indigenous people. The way this negotiation happens points back 
again to the level of decentralization. If a state is not democratically and party decentralized, then 
the MNC will consult with the central government without acknowledging the needs and 
preferences of local residents. Moser (2001) talks about MNCs’ failure to consult with local 
communities:  
 
An important consequence of prioritizing alignment with Central Government 
expectations is that these MNCs perceived themselves as operating largely in isolation 
from their local context, notably local communities living in the project area. They 
overemphasized their own importance, while underplaying the significance of the broader 
local social context of which they formed only a part. They frequently failed to 
acknowledge the indirect impacts of their activities (Moser, 2001, 301). 
 
Summarizing the literature above, although decentralization has overall increased in Latin 
America and has thus, improved indigenous peoples’ access to local government, limitations to 
environmental and natural resource policies that directly effect indigenous groups leaves them 
with little to no power on how the central governments can use natural resources located on their 
land.  This presents the paradox that this paper will attempt to solve: despite having legal 
autonomy and ownership of their land, the constitutions of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Brazil permit 
central government to utilize natural resources on indigenous land whenever they need.  I argue 
that economic autonomy, indigenous strength, and pro-indigenous ideology effects how a 
government responds to indigenous land rights violations.  
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1.4 Low Economic Autonomy and Indigenous Territorial Rights Abuse 
1.4.1  Territorial Rights In	  Latin	  America,	  indigenous	  people	  have	  been	  marginalized	  for	  centuries	  since	  the	  Spanish	  conquest.	  Not	  until	  the	  1990s	  were	  indigenous	  people’s	  rights	  widely	  recognized.	  The	  International	  Labour	  Organization	  No.	  169	  in	  the	  Indigenous	  and	  Tribal	  Peoples	  Convention,	  indigenous	  people	  and	  indigenous	  territorial	  protections	  are	  defined	  as:	  	  
(a)	  tribal	  peoples	  in	  independent	  countries	  whose	  social,	  cultural	  and	  economic	  conditions	  distinguish	  them	  from	  other	  sections	  of	  the	  national	  community,	  and	  whose	  status	  is	  regulated	  wholly	  or	  partially	  by	  their	  own	  customs	  or	  traditions…	  (b)	  peoples	  in	  independent	  countries	  who	  are	  regarded	  as	  indigenous	  on	  account	  of	  their	  descent	  from	  the	  populations	  which	  inhabited	  the	  country…	  (Whiteman,	  2009,	  102).	  
For	  many	  indigenous	  people,	  territorial	  rights	  are	  a	  direct	  link	  to	  maintaining	  cultural	  autonomy	  and	  livelihood.	  	  Article	  7	  of	  the	  ILO	  169	  describes	  protections	  of	  indigenous	  territory.	  	  It	  obligates	  governments	  to	  collaborate	  with	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  assessment	  and	  participation	  with	  any	  development	  activity	  on	  land	  they	  inhabit.	  It	  also	  states	  that	  governments,	  with	  the	  cooperation	  of	  indigenous	  peoples,	  should	  take	  measures	  to	  protect	  and	  preserve	  the	  environments	  they	  inhabit	  (ilo.org).	  	  For	  example,	  many	  indigenous	  communities	  living	  in	  rural	  areas	  make	  their	  living	  on	  subsistence	  farming.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  large	  agribusiness	  company	  that	  wants	  another	  product	  produced	  using	  “western	  techniques”	  made	  at	  a	  cheaper	  price,	  then	  farming	  families’	  livelihood	  usually	  will	  be	  in	  danger.	  According	  to	  Petras.	  et	  al.	  (2005):	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The	  1980s	  presented	  a	  new	  conjuncture	  in	  the	  history	  of	  this	  new	  struggle…	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  new	  economic	  model	  in	  the	  form	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  policy	  reforms	  created	  conditions	  that	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  reached	  crisis	  proportions…those	  indigenous	  communities	  and	  peasant	  farmers	  that	  retained	  access	  to	  some	  land	  were	  hit	  by	  a	  decline	  in	  demand	  in	  their	  product…(Petras	  et	  al.,	  139,	  2005).	  	  
The	  ILO	  169	  Convention	  on	  Indigenous	  and	  Tribal	  Peoples	  was	  written	  in	  September	  1989	  and	  put	  into	  force	  in	  1991.	  Even	  though	  several	  Latin	  American	  countries	  ratified	  the	  Convention	  (Bolivia	  ratified	  the	  Convention	  in	  the	  same	  year,	  1991;	  Brazil	  ratified	  it	  in	  2002;	  and	  Ecuador	  in	  1998),	  there	  are	  still	  many	  cases	  where	  governments	  do	  not	  actually	  enforce	  this	  law.	  	  
1.4.2 Extractive Industry Exploitation in Indigenous Territories and Economic 
Autonomy Latin	  America	  has	  used	  resource	  extraction	  for	  the	  development	  of	  their	  economies.	  In	  the	  1990s,	  many	  Latin	  American	  countries	  received	  IMF	  loans,	  signed	  free	  trade	  agreements,	  and	  sought	  foreign	  investment	  in	  natural	  resource	  extractive	  industries.	  Many	  of	  these	  projects	  were	  to	  repay	  debts	  and	  to	  rebuild	  the	  economy	  after	  the	  strategy	  of	  Import	  Substitution	  Industrialization	  failed	  in	  the	  1970s.	  Out	  of	  these	  attempts	  to	  develop,	  conflicts	  with	  indigenous	  people	  increased.	  	  
The problem with the foreign investment-led development strategy was that in order to 
attract international investment by multinational corporations, “labor and social policy standards 
have been gradually reduced to the minimum,” resulting in growing poverty (Rudra, 2008). In 
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Nita Rudra’s “Globalization and Race to the Bottom in Developing Countries,” (2008) she 
argues that globalization “leads to lower social welfare expenditures in labor-rich developing 
countries.”  
Levine and Molina (2011) discuss the concept of  economic autonomy --  the more debt a 
government accumulates from a foreign institution or government, the less control they have 
over making independent decisions.   They measure economic autonomy by using the indicator 
based on the value of foreign debt service as a percentage of the value of exports of each country 
in 2004 (World Bank 2006). The result of this percentage is the weight of debt on the economy: 
the “greater the weight of debt on the overall economy, the more likely it is that the country will 
be obligated to follow economic policies dictated by its creditors” (Levine and Molina, 2007, 
25). For my study, I will use the indicators for the most recent time span the cases take place 
(2010-2014). 
An article by Jonathan Watts in The Guardian supports this notion. Watts writes about a 
drilling project in the Yasuní Rainforest Reserve, one of the many projects Ecuador is carrying 
out on indigenous or protected lands because of pressure to “pay back debts to China” (2014). 
Though Bolivia is less involved with transnational trade, resource extraction is still a major 
method of its development. However, because many of the mining companies are nationalized, 
the government has more control in monitoring and enforcing social responsibility regulations on 
the companies. Rochlin (2007) writes: 
That sense of social justice implies not only paying a sizeable tax to the 
government, it also entails a redefined corporate responsibility at the 
community level…mines are expected to provide clear social welfare and 
infrastructural projects to the communities in which they operate (1333). 
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Latin America’s governments generally have moderate to high decentralization levels.  According to the 
World Bank, the region of Latina America has made “long strides in improving decentralization policies”. 
However, holes in decentralization systems exist. These include language requirements for voting and 
local governments being unable to impact environmental policy or what the central government uses 
natural resources located in subnational regions put indigenous peoples at a disadvantage when trying to 
change policy regarding the environment.  
 
1.5 Pro-Indigenous Ideologies 
 
Acknowledging indigenous rights in a country’s constitution is an important step for 
national governments to respect indigenous rights. According to J. Wolff (2012), both Bolivia 
and Ecuador became “plurinational “states when they recognized indigenous nationalities and 
languages in the 1990s. Both Presidents Correa of Ecuador and Morales of Bolivia promised and 
initiated a more leftist approach to their governments. Both constitutions have allowed citizens to 
propose legislation, provide popular consultation, and have established regional or municipal and 
indigenous autonomies (Wolff, 2012, 5). Because Bolivia and Ecuador are not federal systems, 
but decentralized systems, they allow for “better institutional environments for indigenous 
municipalities, movements, and parties” (Van Cott, 2007, 26). 
 
In addition to these institutional changes, both Bolivia and Ecuador are signatories of the 
ILO 169 on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Tribal Populations which states that 
governments “shall establish and maintain procedures through which they shall consult with 
these peoples…before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration of such 
resources pertaining to their lands” (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2014).  Although states like Ecuador and 
Brazil are signatories of this agreement that requires consultation, researchers have  observed the 
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lack of “meaningful” consultation, which is a process that “permits a well-informed, culturally 
appropriate and influential participation of affected communities” (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2014, 2).   
 
1.6 Indigenous Strength 
1.6.1 Movements and Parties 
   As established above, indigenous people in Latin America lacked representation and 
respect from the government prior to the 1980s and 1990s, when an increased awareness of 
political rights, nongovernmental organizations, and other transnational institutions, pressured 
governments to remain accountable of international human rights standards (Barrera, et. al 
2010). This part of the literature review will cover the impact of indigenous movements and 
political parties and how they become successful in affecting government decisions. 
 Recently, more and more indigenous groups have tried to change policy through 
protesting and forming their own political parties, such as Bolivia’s current governing party 
Movimiento al Socialismo, or the Movement toward Socialism (MAS).  This party has been 
successful in recruiting white, mestizo, and indigenous supporters from various ethnicities.  This 
has allowed for more protection of poor laborers and indigenous rights (Madrid, 2012).  
Indigenous strength depends on several factors, like ethnic fractionalization or inclusivity 
(Madrid, 2012; Levine and Molina, 2011). Once in power, or if still campaigning, the party must 
make up ten percent of the legislature to influence policy. In order to mobilize the most 
supporters, indigenous movements as well as indigenous politicians need to employ inclusive 
tactics to attract members of other indigenous groups or non-indigenous groups. Madrid talks 
about the difficulties that some indigenous movements faced when excluding non-indigenous 
 15  
people: 
 
A few indigenous parties and leaders have expressed hostility to the non-indigenous 
population, but these parties have traditionally fared extremely poorly in elections in 
Latin America, even among the indigenous voters they claim to represent. The radical 
“Indianista” parties in Bolivia, for example, never obtained more than 2 percent of the 
vote in national elections. The Movimiento Indígena Pachacuti (MIP), a Bolivian 
indigenous party whose leader, Felipe Quispe, has at times voiced hostility to non-
indigenous people, did win 6 percent of the national vote in the 2002 Bolivian elections, 
but Quispe toned down some of his inflammatory rhetoric during the campaign (Madrid, 
2005). 
 
 Those that are exclusive (i.e., only focus on mobilizing members within their own group 
and exclude other indigenous or non-indigenous people) will tend not to be successful in gaining 
support to push for policies or politicians that protect indigenous land rights. With the growing 
presence and support of NGOs, indigenous political strength now have new ways of organizing 
and attracting national and international attention.  
 
1.7 The Role of INGOs  
Transnational actors like nongovernmental organizations and international 
nongovernmental organizations can assist in supporting the protection of indigenous land rights. 
Studies by Sikkink (1998) illustrate the growing effect that NGOS and INGOs have on domestic 
governments.  She states that the 1994 Chiapas conflict in Mexico got the world’s attention 
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(since electronic mail was the primary use of communication to other NGOs that then rose 
international awareness of the issue). On the eve of the ratification of NAFTA in early 1994, the 
National Zapatista Liberation Army (EZLN) organized and protested against NAFTA because 
they feared that this agreement would take away their subsistence and they would not be able to 
compete with large American corporations (Navarro, 2006). Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) 
boomerang theory explains how protesters gain the support of the international community. First, 
protesters gain support and visibility from domestic NGOs. From there, domestic NGOs increase 
the visibility of the issue, shame the perpetrating government, and provide information to 
subnational entities and other INGOs or international governmental organizations (IGOs) (see 
graph 1 in appendix). Afterwards, INGOs pressure and inform intergovernmental organizations 
which then returns to the perpetrating government and pressures that government to stop its 
abuse. According to Sikkink, et al. (1998), the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) 
“demonstrated a sophisticated awareness of the international press and other transnational 
actors” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 115).  As a result, the press, domestic NGOS, and INGOs 
closely monitored the conflict and the “government acted with greater restraint for a political 
solution in Chiapas because it was now accountable to constituencies beyond its borders which 
had raised the political costs of repression” (Keck, and Sikkink, 1998, 115). Furthermore, 
international governments will tend to use sanctions on human rights violators (Lutz; Sikkink, 
2000).  
Brysk (2000) agrees that the transnational network makes an impact on indigenous rights 
policies. Her research is an exact illustration of Keck and Sikkink’s theory. She states in her 
research, that the “Global Transnational Network”, or “institutional links across international 
borders  (i.e. international organizations, integrated markets, and transnational social 
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movements)”, increases pressure on the state through raising awareness and pressuring (through 
protests and shaming campaigns that reveal human rights abuses) international institutions like 
the World Bank to stop payments or support for projects by MNCs:  
Groups such as the National Resources Defense Council and the Wildlife Fund exerted 
constant pressure in 21 House and Senate hearings on World Bank performance and 
funding. The Environmental Defense Fund delivered 21,000 individual protest petitions 
to the World Bank. The World Bank suspended payments on the Polonoreoeste project in 
1985 until modifications were made (Bryske , 2000). 
Fundapaz is another example of how NGOs help to strengthen indigenous movements in Brazil. 
Fundapaz, a Catholic NGO, understood the cultural difference that caused a gap in 
communication and development in indigenous communities with non-indigenous communities. 
In 1997, Fundapaz specifically served indigenous communities by “promoting different kinds of 
projects in the Wichí (indigenous group) and criollo communities” (Eversole, 2003, 67). The 
NGO acted as a mediator between Wichí communities and as a lobby group in pressuring the 
government (Eversole, 2003, 67).  
NGOs also played a critical role during the uprising of the “Black October” Indigenous 
Rights Movement in Bolivia (Martin et al., 2008, 586). The Black October Revolution gained 
international support and funding by the European Union in the Northern Oruro department 
called the Campesino Self-Development Project. This project  funded local community 
developments in the form of ayllus which connected Oxfam representatives, indigenous leaders, 
and communities(Martin, et al., 2008, 575). These networks and the networks of other NGOs 
greatly strengthened indigenous groups in Latin America. 
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Brazil’s indigenous movement is unique because of the role the Catholic Church in 
mobilizing indigenous people in Brazil (Brysk, 2000, 78). Due to the threat that indigenous land 
ownership status was to be revoked, Catholic missionaries assisted in providing transportation 
and food, and encouraged indigenous leaders from different groups to come together to share 
their unique experiences with resource extraction on their land. After some time these indigenous 
groups united to become the Union of Indian Nations (UNI). The UNI gained national attention 
and support from other NGOs like the Brazilian Anthropological Association and the National 
Association of Geologists. Because of symbolic and pressure politics (like protesting or 
shaming), the Brazilian government redistributed land back to the original indigenous owners in 
the 1980s through 2006 (M. Carter 2011). However, due to the continued push for extractive 
projects for development, there have been recent reports of the Brazilian government ignoring its 
constitutional law of prior consultation  (Amazon Watch, 2014, 
http://amazonwatch.org/news/2014/0311-indigenous-leader-condemns-brazils-rights-abuses-at-
united-nations). With international support and collaboration among various indigenous 
Brazilian tribes, indigenous groups have stepped in and succeeded in getting a proposal passed in 
congress that would, if approved, prevent the demarcation of indigenous lands by farmers or 
agri-business groups (Survival International, 2014, 
http://www.survivalinternational.org/news/10623). 
 
1.8 Theory:  
Though predicting a government’s decision on giving meaningful consultation is 
complex, certain factors help predict the likelihood of governments carrying out meaningful 
consultations.  I argue that if a state is highly autonomous economically, if it has a constitution 
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that supports indigenous rights and autonomy, if the ideology of a state is pro-indigenous, and 
has strong indigenous groups, then the state will tend to carry out more meaningful consultations.  
1.9 Independent Variables: 
1.9.1 Economic Autonomy 
a) Conceptual Definition: The amount of control a government has to make economic 
policy decisions independently from its obligations from loan agreements that the 
government is engaged in. 
b) Operationalization: Levine and Molina measure economic autonomy by using the 
indicator based on the value of foreign debt service as a percentage of the value of 
exports of each country in 2004 (World Bank 2006). The result of this percentage is the 
weight of debt on the economy: the “greater the weight of debt on the overall economy, 
the more likely it is that the country will be obligated to follow economic policies 
dictated by its creditors” (Levine and Molina, 2007, 25). For my study, I will use the 
indicators from the World Bank’s measure of the value of foreign debt service (which is 
“the sum of principal repayments and interest actually paid in currency, goods, or 
services on long-term debt, interest paid on short-term debt, and repayments (repurchases 
and charges) to the IMF” 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.TDS.DECT.EX.ZS?page=2)) as a percentage of 
the value of exports.  I use this measurement for the most recent time span, the cases take 
place in 2010-2014).  That percentage is then subtracted from 100. The difference would 
be the economy that is separate from repayments to the IMF and, therefore, the economic 
autonomy. The higher the number, the more economically autonomous the state is. To 
distinguish among high and low autonomy, I will implement a scale of high, moderate, 
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and low autonomy: 0-37% is no autonomy; 38%-58% is low autonomy; 59%-79% is 
moderately autonomous, and 80%-100%  is high economic autonomy. 
c) Hypothesis: The closer to 100 the state’s economic autonomy is, the more likely it is to 
have meaningful consultations with indigenous groups. 
 
1.9.2 Pro-indigenous Ideology & Policies:  
a) Conceptual Definition:  A state is pro-indigenous when it recognizes 
indigenous people as citizens of the state with constitutional rights to be 
protected, and that supports the cultural and territorial autonomy of indigenous 
peoples. 
b)  Operationalization:  This IV is dichotomous in that a state is considered “pro-
indigenous” when it includes all of the following qualities: (1) it is a signatory 
of the ILO 169 and (2) it includes in its constitution that the state is  
plurinational, that is, made up of  different ethnic groups and recognizes 
indigenous languages as official languages of the state. If a state does not have 
both of these characteristics, it will not be considered “pro-indigenous”. 
c) Hypothesis: States that are signatories of the ILO 169 and recognize indigenous 
peoples and languages as protected citizens in their constitutions with rights to 
cultural and political autonomy, tend to carry out meaningful consultations. 
1.9.3 Indigenous Strength: 
 
a)          Conceptual Definition:  indigenous strength is defined by indigenous groups 
that are protesting against the violating government or corporation who demonstrate 
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unity (minimal fractionalization among different types of indigenous ethnicities), 
inclusivity (including non-indigenous constituents in support network), and ability to 
gain international support (any international support from international NGOs, i.e. 
advocacy, sanctions, financial contributions, protests, and technical support, for 
policy change, and pressure in form of sanctions can count as INGO pressure).  
b)         Operationalization:  Indigenous fractionalization refers to how cohesive the 
affected group is. If all members of affected groups are in agreement with what they 
want get out of the consultation and their plan of action to defend their land rights, 
they will count as cohesive. For indigenous strength, I will use Madrid’s theory 
(which defines inclusive as the affected indigenous group working with other 
indigenous, ethnic, or non-indigenous groups in their movement) and the ability to 
attract attention of domestic or international NGOs to pressure the domestic 
government to enforce protection of indigenous land rights over its original plans or 
the plans of other resource extractive company in the affected area. Even though I 
will follow Keck and Sikkink’s Boomerang Theory to determine this pattern, it is not 
necessary that the pattern follow exactly the order of the “boomerang effect” present 
to cause the change. The pressure can come from domestic systems or international 
sources. The end is if indigenous groups achieve change in their favor. 
c)  Hypothesis: Indigenous peoples that are inclusive in their protests and movements 
and are able to gain national and international support to pressure the perpetrating 
state are more likely to achieve meaningful consultations. 
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1.10 Dependent Variable 
1.10.1 Meaningful Consultation 
a) Conceptual Definition: culturally competent talks between the affected indigenous group  
(the people and land which is being unwillingly used for resource extraction by the 
government or by the MNC) with the leaders and planners of the natural resource 
extraction activity, along with a representative of the central government, that are not 
usually under time pressures by the corporation. The end decision, though a compromise 
between the two parties, must reflect the interests of the affected indigenous group. 
b) Operationalization: Meaningful consultation, also dichotomous, will be defined in my 
study as including the characteristics used in Schilling-Vacaflor’s study. A consultation is 
considered “meaningful” when (1) it lasts approximately 13 weeks or more (the average 
amount of time it takes for a meaningful consultation in Bolivia); (2) the consultation is 
held in both Spanish and the language(s) of the affected indigenous group(s), and when 
concepts that are only understood in one culture are translated to the other culture to 
ensure full understanding; (3) and when final decisions are adjusted to reflect interests for 
the affected indigenous groups. 
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Table 1 How the Independent Variables Interact to Effect the Likelihood of Meaningful 
Consultations 
 Pro-Indigenous Not Pro-indigenous 
High Economic Autonomy 
only 
Sometimes Almost Never 
Strong Indigenous Group 
only 
Sometimes Sometimes 
Both Strong Indigenous 
Group and High Economic 
Autonomy 
Almost Always Sometimes 
 
Figure 1 Keck and Sikkink's Boomerang Theory for Raising International & 
Transnational Awareness and Support 
Starting from the left, the first NGO tries to pressure State A (the perpetrating government).Then 
the first NGO from the home state raises awareness and attention from other NGOs in different 
countries, which then  pressures that government to respond to State A’s violations. State B then 
goes to an international government organization to receive support in pressuring State A. After 
the process of pressuring State A (through shaming politics or sanctions, etc.), State A then 
intervenes to stop indigenous rights violations. 
 
IGO/	  
INGO	  
State	  
A	  
NGO	   NGO	  
State	  
B	  
 24  
Table 2 Independent Variable Variation 
This table illustrates the characteristics of each case. Because Bolivia is pro-indigenous, has 
indigenous strength, and has high economic autonomy, Bolivia is more likely to have meaningful 
consultations. This will be explained in the case studies. 
 
	   Bolivia	   Ecuador	   Brazil	  
Pro-­‐Indigenous	   ü 	   	   	  
Indigenous	  Strength	   ü 	   ü 	   ü 	  
High	  Economic	  
Autonomy	  
ü 	   ü 	   	  
Moderate	  Economic	  
Autonomy	  
	   	   ü 	  
Low	  Economic	  
Autonomy	  
	   	   	  
	  
1.11 Methodology: 
To investigate my question, I employ three case studies. I will write one and compare one 
case for each country: the Guarani case for Bolivia, as it could be considered by some as an 
example of success in holding meaningful consultations;  the Yasuní case in Ecuador; and 
construction of the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Dam Complex in Brazil which are two examples 
of failure to hold meaningful consultations for indigenous groups. I compare why in the Bolivia 
case the government facilitated consultation with the Guarani and why in Ecuador and Brazil the 
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governments did not enforce meaningful consultations. I examine how my variables of economic 
autonomy, pro-indigeneity, and indigenous strength play roles in the outcomes of these cases. I 
chose these three countries because of their differences in the outcomes and characteristics. 
Though decentralization is not a variable, I briefly state how each country is decentralized and 
why decentralization policies in these countries do not prevent MNCs or central governments 
from extracting natural resources from their land.  For this study, I define decentralization as the 
presence of regional and municipal (local) governments.  Because the number of municipalities 
varies for each state and the names for each regional government (i.e. departments, provinces, 
etc.) differ, I will only categorize a state to be “decentralized” or “not decentralized”. This 
uniform definition is used to include all the forms of decentralization in each state and to focus 
on why none of the decentralization systems benefit indigenous people since this is the common 
factor. 
Country Indigenous Population Economic 
Autonomy 
Strong 
Indigenous 
Groups 
Pro-
Indigenous 
Ideology 
Bolivia Majority (62%) –World Bank Highest Yes Yes 
Ecuador Minority (25%) –World Bank High Yes No 
Brazil Minority (.4%) 
-Survival International 
(http://www.survivalinternational.
org/tribes/brazilian) 
Moderate Yes No 
 
I use online news sources and NGO websites to monitor the coverage on the indigenous protests 
of the dams in Brazil and the Yasuní development project in Ecuador. I examine how indigenous 
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groups were able to collaborate with other indigenous and non-indigenous ethnicities and/ or 
politicians for support. I also use UN reports and briefs on the Guarani case in Bolivia. For 
decentralization, I use data from the Georgetown University’s Political Database of the 
Americas. 
I chose my cases to show variation in the dependent variable among a universe of 
episodes of natural resource extractive activity in indigenous areas.   In the Bolivian case, 
consultations with indigenous groups have taken place whereas in Ecuador and in Brazil they 
have not, despite their being signatories of ILO 169.  I choose the Guarani case in Bolivia 
because it is an example of what meaningful consultations look like, and also, what other 
conflicts can arise from consultations. For example, how inclusion and cohesion of different 
indigenous ethnic groups can influence effectiveness in the consultation process, or how being a 
country with an indigenous majority can even complicate the consultation process..   
On the contrary, in Ecuador, which is a country with an indigenous minority (that live mostly in 
rural or forested areas) and a signatory of the ILO 169, had the shift from being pro-indigenous 
during the governments prior to Correa to less pro-indigenous during Correa’s presidency. This 
shift resulted in the president not carrying out consultations at all with indigenous people.. Brazil 
also has not carried out consultations about the proposal of the hydroelectric dam despite it also 
being an ILO 169 signatory.   
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2 CASE STUDIES 
2.1 Ecuador 
2.1.1 Problem  The	  Yasuní	  National	  Park	  is	  located	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  the	  Amazon,	  the	  Andes	  Mountains,	  and	  the	  equator.	  It	  is	  recognized	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  bio-­‐diverse	  areas	  in	  the	  world,	  which	  also	  houses	  a	  large	  oil	  reserve	  (Finer,	  Vijay	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  1).	  It	  is	  also	  recognized	  for	  its	  cultural	  diversity	  as	  well	  as	  its	  home	  for	  the	  Guarani	  and	  other	  indigenous	  groups	  (Finer,	  Vijay,	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  1).	  	  Because	  of	  these	  factors,	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  interest	  on	  the	  international	  and	  national	  level	  for	  several	  motives	  like	  resource	  extraction	  and	  environmental	  conservation.	  	  At	  the	  expansion	  of	  oil	  and	  petroleum	  development	  in	  the	  1980s,	  there	  were	  more	  cases	  of	  illegal	  logging	  and	  oil	  exploration.	  By	  1999,	  a	  decree	  of	  	  ‘Zona	  Intangible’	  was	  marked	  in	  the	  lower	  region	  of	  the	  Yasuní	  to	  set	  an	  off-­‐limits	  area	  from	  extractive	  activities	  (Finer,	  Vijay,	  et	  al.,2009,	  9).	  	  
When	  President	  Correa	  was	  elected,	  he	  tried	  to	  build	  from	  the	  momentum	  of	  the	  Pachakutik	  Movement.	  The	  Pachakutik	  Movement	  was	  a	  social	  justice	  movement	  	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  that	  later	  became	  a	  political	  party	  that	  gave	  indigenous	  communities	  and	  other	  disadvantaged	  groups	  an	  alternative	  for	  political	  representation	  and	  an	  opportunity	  to	  move	  away	  from	  neoliberal	  policies	  that	  many	  indigenous	  groups	  disagreed	  with	  (Beck,	  2008,	  xi.).	  Correa,	  promising	  to	  prioritize	  indigenous	  and	  environmental	  rights,	  decided	  to	  launch	  the	  ITT	  (named	  after	  the	  three	  untapped	  oil	  fields:	  Ishpingo–Tiputini–Tambococha)	  Initiative	  which	  was	  to	  provide	  an	  alternative	  to	  drilling	  in	  the	  ITT	  oil	  fields	  in	  “exchange	  for	  international	  compensation”	  (Beck,	  2008,	  12).	  Because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  international	  financial	  contributions,	  President	  Correa	  was	  pushed	  to	  drill	  in	  those	  areas	  to	  supply	  for	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the	  national	  income	  through	  oil	  extraction	  since,	  according	  to	  Escribano	  (2013),	  oil	  extraction	  has	  been	  the	  primary	  source	  for	  development	  for	  over	  thirty	  years	  (and	  the	  ITT	  reserves	  make	  up	  one-­‐fifth	  of	  the	  country’s	  oil	  reserves).	  Ecuador	  has	  also	  relied	  on	  loans	  from	  China	  to	  help	  reach	  their	  development	  goals	  and	  to	  pay	  back	  their	  international	  loans	  in	  exchange	  for	  oil.	  	  Due	  to	  this	  agreement	  with	  China,	  Correa	  is	  now	  faced	  with	  pressures	  to	  drill	  in	  the	  Yasuní	  area.	  There	  have	  been	  many	  other	  instances	  where	  President	  Correa	  has	  been	  reluctant	  or	  has	  even	  ignored	  indigenous	  land	  protections	  for	  development,	  going	  as	  far	  as	  to	  cancel	  the	  Yasuní	  ITT	  initiative	  in	  August	  of	  2013(sosyasuni.org).	  The	  president	  has	  overstepped	  many	  controls	  of	  his	  office	  and	  has	  gone	  back	  on	  many	  of	  the	  promises	  he	  made	  before	  becoming	  president.	  Below	  are	  sections	  that	  explain	  how	  economic	  autonomy	  are	  related	  to	  this	  phenomenon.	  
2.1.2 Decentralization 	   Despite	  the	  challenges	  their	  efforts	  have	  faced	  to	  create	  local	  governments	  since	  the	  1980s,	  Ecuador	  has	  continued	  to	  develop	  its	  local	  government	  systems	  (Daughters,	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Ecuador	  is	  divided	  into	  21	  provinces	  with	  autonomous	  councils	  and	  has	  221	  municipalities	  in	  which	  municipal	  government	  officials	  are	  elected	  through	  secret	  popular	  vote	  (localdemocracy.net).	  Fiscally,	  according	  to	  a	  report	  by	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank,	  the	  local	  governments	  only	  use	  23%	  of	  central	  government	  expenditure.	  So,	  fiscally,	  local	  governments	  are	  decentralized	  but	  are	  unable	  to	  change	  policy	  because	  the	  natural	  environment	  sector	  is	  nationally	  controlled.	  This	  decentralization	  has	  allowed	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  regional	  organizations	  like	  the	  AIECH, 
Asociación de Indígenas Evangélicos de Chimborazo (the Indigenous Evangelist Association of 
Chimborazo), and FEINE (Ecuadorian Evangelical Indigenous Federation) as  “local resources 
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became more available for indigenous groups to organize and hold local elections” (Lucero, 
2005, 33). Despite Ecuador’s challenges to implement political decentralization laws in the early 
2000s, there was political opportunity for transnational actions to support de facto 
decentralization in some areas like health, education, and water management (Kauffman, 2011, 
6). However, like in Bolivia, environmental management is under the jurisdiction of national 
ministries like the Ministry of Environment of Ecuador, which the central government controls 
(Kauffman, 2011).  According to MacDonald (2011), Ecuador’s 2008 constitution gives 
Jurisdicción Indigena (Indigenous Jurisdiction) over territory but does not specify to what extent 
indigenous peoples have control over natural resources. MacDonald (2011) argues that this is 
true because the state does not want to give absolute control over to local governments and risk 
losing and accounting for its over all wealth.  The Political Database of the Americas at 
Georgetown University also shows that Ecuador’s constitution gives the central government 
power to enforce environmental policies that “will be applied cutting across all sectors and 
dimensions” (pdba.georgiatown.edu). Because environmental resources are under central 
government control, it is more challenging for local governments to fight policies or 
environmental extraction projects that were approved or overlooked by the national government.   
 
2.1.3 Constitutions, Ideology, and Movements Ecuador	  became	  a	  plurinational	  state	  at	  the	  recognition	  of	  indigenous	  people	  in	  Chapter	  Four,	  Article	  56	  of	  the	  2008	  Constitution:	  	  
Indigenous	  communities,	  peoples	  and	  nations,	  the	  Afro-­‐Ecuadorian	  people,	  the	  back-­‐country	  people	  (montubios)	  of	  the	  inland	  coastal	  region,	  and	  communes	  are	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part	  of	  the	  single	  and	  indivisible	  Ecuadorian	  State	  (Political	  Database	  of	  the	  Americas,	  http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html).	  
Also,	  upon	  signing	  the	  ILO	  169	  in	  1998,	  the	  Ecuadorian	  government	  acknowledged	  and	  promised	  to	  protect	  indigenous	  lands	  and	  conserve	  their	  culture.	  	  Even	  though,	  like	  Bolivia,	  Ecuador	  officially	  recognizes	  indigenous	  communities	  as	  citizens	  with	  constitutional	  rights.	  However,	  “being	  indigenous”	  does	  not	  have	  the	  same	  meaning	  and	  weight	  as	  it	  does	  in	  Bolivia.	  In	  Bolivia,	  indigenous	  groups	  transcend	  class	  and	  geographic	  lines,	  whereas	  in	  Ecuador,	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  indigenous	  communities	  live	  in	  extreme	  poverty	  and	  in	  non-­‐urban	  areas	  (Gustafson,	  2009).	  Furthermore,	  indigenous	  languages	  are	  not	  recognized	  in	  the	  Ecuadorian	  constitution;	  only	  Spanish	  is	  recognized	  as	  the	  official	  language	  (Gustafson,	  2009,	  11).	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  more	  clear	  as	  to	  who	  is	  indigenous	  and	  who	  is	  not	  in	  Ecuador	  than	  in	  Bolivia.	  	  
Instead	  of	  supporting	  the	  ITT	  initiative	  and	  land	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  people,	  as	  President	  Correa	  promised	  during	  his	  campaign,	  there	  have	  been	  reports	  revealing	  that	  President	  Correa	  is	  purposefully	  ignoring	  indigenous	  rights	  to	  meaningful	  consultations:	  	  
After	  president	  Correa	  cancelled	  the	  Yasuní	  ITT	  Initiative	  on	  16	  August	  2013,	  people	  started	  to	  demonstrate	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  country.	  Despite	  this,	  the	  national	  parliament,	  where	  Correa’s	  Alianza	  Pais	  holds	  absolute	  majority,	  approved	  the	  president’s	  oil	  exploitation	  plans	  in	  October	  of	  the	  same	  year-­‐	  without	  consulting	  Ecuadorian	  citizens	  (sosyasuni.org)	  
According to Raul Zibechi of the Center for International Policy’s Americas Program, Correa 
does not take the constitutional rights of indigenous groups seriously: 
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Albert Acosta, Ecuadorian economist and former president of the Constitutional 
Assembly, posits that it is crucial that laws be passed in language that is rooted in 
everyday life. If this doesn’t happen, no matter how advanced the Constitution is it will 
mean nothing. The problem is that President Correa believes that laws about water and 
communication aren’t important, which, for Acosta, is the same as saying that “the 
Constitution is neither fundamental nor a priority”. He wonders: “Could it be that 
President Correa sees the Constitution as a straight jacket?” (Zibechi, 2010, America’s 
Program, http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/2810). 
 
Also, Ecuador’s prior consultation laws do not require consent or approval of extractive projects 
by indigenous groups. According to Luis Angel Saavedra’s article on consultation and prior 
consent, corporations and the Ecuadorian government have used the vagueness of the law 
requiring prior consultation “convene a meeting of the community” and inform them about 
government plans with no opportunity for the community to express their agreement or 
disagreement with the proposal” (Saavedra, 2011, 6). According to the Freedom House article by 
Senior Research Assistant Ashley Greco-Stoner, “Correa is invoking an exception in the 
country’s 2008 constitution that allows oil to be extracted from protected land in cases of 
national interest” and “abandoning conservation efforts”  (2013).  Even though environmentalists 
and anthropologists have warned against this drilling project, saying that this project threatens 
indigenous and natural life, Correa still plans to drill and has not consulted with the potentially 
affected indigenous groups.  Soon	  after	  as	  President	  Correa	  abandoned	  the	  Yasuní	  ITT	  initiative,	  citizens	  formed	  the	  Yasunidos,	  which	  is	  what	  the	  movement	  is	  known	  by.	  Since	  its	  formation,	  there	  have	  been	  protests	  from	  both	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  non-­‐indigenous	  citizens	  from	  provinces	  all	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over	  Ecuador	  with	  the	  backing	  of	  85%	  of	  Ecuadoran	  citizens	  (sosyasuni.org).	  Methods	  that	  are	  currently	  being	  used	  include	  creating	  its	  own	  website	  where	  participants	  can	  download	  and	  sign	  petitions	  and	  social	  media	  websites	  like	  Twitter	  and	  Facebook	  to	  also	  increase	  awareness	  and	  support	  internationally.	  	  	  
2.1.4 Economic Autonomy Until	  Ecuador’s	  constitution	  was	  redrafted	  in	  2008	  under	  President	  Correa,	  Ecuador	  was	  less	  open	  to	  getting	  involved	  in	  free	  trade/	  multilateral	  agreements	  due	  to	  the	  potentially	  negative	  effects	  they	  may	  have	  had	  on	  indigenous	  land	  and	  other	  conservation	  areas	  (Levine,	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  However,	  upon	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  2008	  constitution	  (and	  the	  election	  of	  Correa),	  the	  government	  redefined	  how	  Ecuador	  would	  become	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  global	  economy.	  	  Instead	  of	  being	  involved	  with	  free	  trade	  agreements,	  Ecuador’s	  constitution	  talks	  about	  maintaining	  its	  consistency	  with	  the	  “national	  plan	  for	  good	  living”	  yet	  helping	  to	  integrate	  Ecuador	  into	  the	  global	  economy	  and	  to	  justify	  its	  multilateral	  trade	  activities.	  In	  doing	  this,	  Ecuador	  hoped	  to	  maintain	  its	  “economic	  sovereignty”	  However,	  reports	  demonstrate	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  Ecuador	  is	  maintaining	  its	  economic	  autonomy.	  According	  to	  the	  World	  Bank,	  Ecuador’s	  total	  debt	  service	  is	  11.2%	  of	  its	  GDP.	  	  This	  means,	  using	  Levine	  and	  Molina’s	  measure,	  Ecuador’s	  economic	  autonomy	  is	  88.8%.	  	  Though	  this	  is	  highly	  economic	  autonomous,	  this	  number	  overlooks	  other	  loans	  that	  Ecuador	  is	  involved	  in	  such	  as	  those	  with	  China.	  Following	  a	  2015	  report	  by	  Amazon	  Watch,	  China	  provided	  61%	  of	  Ecuador’s	  financing	  needs	  and	  has	  been	  pushing	  Ecuador	  for	  drilling	  and	  expanding	  its	  projects	  in	  more	  areas,	  such	  as	  the	  Yasuní	  National	  Park	  and	  Central-­‐South	  Amazon	  (http://amazonwatch.org/news/2015/0113-­‐racking-­‐up-­‐the-­‐china-­‐debt-­‐and-­‐paying-­‐it-­‐forward-­‐with-­‐oil).	  The	  	  report	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that	  Correa	  signed	  a	  letter	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that	  allows	  China	  to	  “seize	  many	  of	  Ecuador’s	  assets	  if	  the	  country	  fails	  to	  repay	  the	  loans.	  (Considering	  this	  fact,	  Ecuador’s	  economic	  autonomy	  may	  be	  even	  lower.	  The	  pressures	  that	  Ecuador	  receives	  from	  its	  transnational	  loan	  agreements	  lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  this	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  President	  Correa	  ignores	  indigenous	  land	  rights	  to	  drill	  for	  oil.	  	  
2.1.5 Conclusion 	   The	  Yasuní	  National	  Park,	  home	  of	  several	  indigenous	  communities	  in	  Ecuador,	  has	  had	  its	  ebbs	  and	  flows	  of	  government	  protection.	  These	  fluctuations	  are	  attributed	  to	  how	  the	  indigenous	  rights	  movements,	  political	  and	  fiscal	  decentralization,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  pro-­‐indigenous	  ideology	  of	  President	  Correa	  interplayed.	  Since	  the	  1980s,	  the	  fiscal	  and	  political	  decentralization	  policies	  had	  helped	  to	  allow	  for	  more	  available	  resources	  and	  representation	  at	  the	  local	  level	  and	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Pachakutik	  political	  party.	  The	  Pachakutik	  Party	  supported	  indigenous	  territorial	  rights	  with	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  ILO	  169.	  However,	  even	  though	  President	  Correa	  appeared	  to	  be	  supportive	  of	  indigenous	  rights	  during	  his	  campaign,	  his	  image	  changed	  when	  he	  signed	  agreements	  to	  receive	  developmental	  loans	  from	  China	  in	  exchange	  for	  oil	  extraction	  targeted	  at	  the	  Yasuní	  National	  Park.	  	  There	  have	  been	  protests	  against	  this	  decision.	  Protestors	  have	  included	  indigenous	  and	  non-­‐indigenous	  Ecuadorians,	  as	  well	  as	  international	  protesting	  of	  citizens	  of	  different	  countries.	  	  
According	  to	  yasuninationalpark.org,	  Correa	  has	  approved	  the	  decision	  in	  April	  2015	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  the	  plans	  to	  drill	  in	  the	  Yasuní	  without	  out	  consulting	  indigenous	  groups.	  The	  fact	  that	  Correa	  has	  not	  consulted	  affected	  indigenous	  groups	  about	  the	  decision	  results	  in	  this	  case	  being	  an	  example	  of	  failed	  meaningful	  prior	  consultations.	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Although	  Ecuador	  has	  implemented	  decentralization	  policies,	  	  this	  does	  not	  benefit	  indigenous	  people	  because	  the	  central	  government	  has	  control	  over	  	  natural	  resources.	  This	  lessens	  the	  power	  that	  indigenous	  communities	  and	  local	  government	  have	  over	  influencing	  more	  protective	  policies	  or	  ensuring	  that	  a	  meaningful	  consultation	  is	  held.	  Because	  the	  central	  government	  has	  absolute	  power	  over	  natural	  resources,	  President	  Correa	  has	  ignored	  indigenous	  peoples’	  rights	  to	  prior	  consultation	  due	  to	  the	  pressure	  he	  receives	  to	  pay	  back	  loans	  provided	  by	  China,	  which	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  how	  much	  of	  a	  role	  economic	  autonomy	  plays	  in	  the	  decisions	  of	  a	  national	  leader.	  	  This	  evidence	  of	  Correa	  may	  have	  been	  pressured	  from	  the	  loans	  from	  China	  to	  ignore	  	  indigenous	  citizens’	  right	  to	  meaningful,	  prior	  consultation.	  
	  
2.2 Bolivia 
2.2.1 The Problem The	  case	  of	  multinational	  corporation	  (MNC)	  abuse	  against	  indigenous	  rights	  in	  the	  Margarita	  oil	  drilling	  case	  in	  Bolivia	  involves	  transnational	  oil	  firms	  like	  Pan-­‐American	  Energy	  and	  the	  BG	  Group.	  All	  of	  these	  firms	  had	  well	  on	  the	  Margarita	  field	  in	  which	  many	  indigenous	  communities	  resided.	  	  In	  1996,	  the	  Bolivian	  Government	  established	  new	  energy	  policies	  that	  would	  allow	  for	  the	  exploration	  and	  extraction	  of	  hydrocarbons	  and	  for	  a	  new	  pipeline	  that	  would	  by	  drilled	  to	  Brazil	  (Perrault,	  2012,	  84).	  The	  Margarita	  hydrocarbon	  gas	  field	  is	  one	  of	  the	  four	  main	  gas	  reserves	  in	  Bolivia	  that	  was	  discovered	  on	  the	  Communal	  Lands	  of	  Origin	  of	  the	  Guarani	  (Perrault,	  2012,	  86).	  	  In	  a	  land	  dispute	  over	  the	  discovery,	  indigenous	  communities	  living	  on	  the	  Margarita	  gas	  field	  wanted	  to	  claim	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over	  10	  million	  hectares	  of	  the	  land	  to	  maintain	  their	  livelihood.	  However,	  the	  government	  only	  gave	  them	  just	  6.8%	  of	  their	  original	  request	  and	  the	  other	  94%	  has	  been	  used	  for	  gas	  and	  oil	  extraction	  (Perrault,	  2012,	  87).	  
	  The	  firms	  that	  had	  a	  well	  on	  the	  Margarita	  field	  attempted	  to	  foster	  a	  good	  relationship	  with	  the	  nearby	  indigenous	  community,	  the	  Guarani,	  by	  constructing	  health	  posts	  and	  adobe	  houses	  (Perrault,	  2008,	  88).	  However,	  according	  to	  Perrault,	  the	  investment	  in	  development	  of	  the	  Guarani	  community	  only	  spent	  0.05	  percent	  of	  its	  payments	  for	  “Guarani	  Development”	  (Perrault,	  2012,	  89) and the rest of its investment in oil 
drilling projects that occurred on indigenous land. The firm violated indigenous land rights 
because the 1991 Bolivian Law 1257 mandates consultation with indigenous communities 
throughout the project’s progress.  
MNCs got around this law because the government in the host country handed the 
responsibility over to the firms and, consequently, did not enforce this law through monitoring or 
ensuring that the corporation carried out its responsibilities to obey the protection laws. As a 
result, there were gas flares, contaminated water, and other conditions that caused adverse health 
effects on the local people and animals. In May 2004 dozens of Guarani came out to peacefully 
protest the gas extraction on their land. The protesters blocked the entrance of food supplies to 
the company workers (Oslem-Nalum, 2012). After five days, the government created a fund in 
which 2% of the rents paid to the state would go to Guarani community development projects 
(Perrault, 2012, 90).  NGOs like Amazon Watch and Bolivian Forum for Environment and 
Development helped to further organize protests.  In 2000, the World Bank also acknowledged 
the lack of oversight of the company.  
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By February 2012, thanks to the additional support of NGOs (the role will be discussed 
later on in the paper), the Guarani were able to come to an agreement with both the Bolivian 
government and the corporation and were given compensation as monetary investment in their 
community for the damages they suffered (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2014,14).	  However,	  contestations	  continued	  as	  the	  process	  of	  meaningful	  consultations	  and	  compensation	  continued	  to	  be	  questioned	  (Schilling-­‐Vacaflor,	  2014,	  14).	  	  Even	  though	  conflicts	  persist,	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  consultations	  being	  held	  with	  indigenous	  groups	  is	  a	  step	  in	  the	  right	  direction	  and	  one	  step	  in	  front	  of	  other	  Latin	  American	  countries	  like	  Ecuador	  and	  Brazil.	  The	  next	  sections	  analyze	  how	  Bolivia	  got	  to	  this	  point.	  
2.2.2 Decentralization Bolivia	  created	  political	  and	  fiscal	  decentralization	  reforms	  in	  the	  1990s	  as	  a	  response	  to	  heightened	  poverty	  and	  unemployment	  levels.	  It	  created	  314	  new	  municipalities	  that	  were	  given	  authority	  to	  make	  decisions	  about	  development	  planning,	  infrastructure	  construction	  and	  budget	  decisions	  (Olsen-­‐Nalum,	  2012).	  	  This	  divided	  Bolivia	  into	  9	  departments	  and	  339	  municipalities	  led	  by	  governors.	  In	  the	  municipalities,	  the	  Guarani	  participate	  in	  popular	  voting	  in	  the	  municipalities	  and	  have	  even	  engaged	  in	  national	  reforms	  (Gustafson,	  2009).	  	  
Bolivian	  fiscal	  decentralization	  is	  27%	  of	  central	  government	  revenue.	  According	  to	  Gustafson	  (2009),	  “the	  most	  commonly	  transferred	  positive	  powers	  are	  tax	  and	  fee	  revenues	  from	  local	  natural	  resources.	  These	  revenues	  have	  made	  significant	  contributions	  to	  local	  communities…”	  (94).	  Decentralization	  reduces	  beauracracy	  and	  decision-­‐making	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time.	  It	  leads	  to	  more	  institution-­‐building	  and	  understanding	  of	  conditions	  (Colfer,	  2005,	  27).	  	  
Despite	  Bolivia’s	  decentralization	  programs,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  the	  national	  state	  government	  owns	  the	  natural	  resources.	  In	  the	  Bolivian	  constitution,	  natural	  resources	  are	  listed	  under	  “exclusive	  competencies	  of	  the	  central	  government.”	  (http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/bolivia09.html).	  Like	  Ecuador,	  this	  exclusive	  access	  of	  the	  central	  government	  to	  natural	  resources	  limits	  local	  government	  and	  indigenous	  control	  over	  natural	  resources	  used	  on	  their	  land.	  For	  example,	  Schilling-­‐Vacaflor	  talks	  about	  the	  confusion	  over	  the	  land	  tenure	  and	  gas	  exploitation.	  After	  disputes	  of	  the	  ownership	  of	  the	  land	  in	  the	  Margarita	  gas	  field	  case,	  the	  area	  was	  claimed	  to	  be	  owned	  by	  the	  state	  and	  rights	  were	  granted	  to	  the	  Bolivian	  Ministry	  of	  Rural	  Development	  and	  Lands	  (Schilling-­‐Vacaflor,	  2014,	  11).	  	  However,	  regional	  organizations	  like	  Central	  de	  
Pueblos	  Indigenous	  de	  La	  Paz	  agreed	  to	  conduct	  meaningful	  consultations.	  They	  agreed	  to	  conditions	  like	  	  “the	  transmittance	  of	  better	  information	  regarding	  planned	  activities,	  the	  elaboration	  of	  a	  strategic	  environmental	  evaluation…”	  (	  Schilling-­‐Vacaflor,	  2014,12).	  	  The	  Guarani	  pushed	  on	  with	  their	  protests	  and	  were	  able	  to	  make	  a	  change	  with	  the	  help	  and	  support	  of	  NGOs	  (discussed	  later	  on).	  	  
Although decentralization may allow for more representation at the local level, de facto 
and de jure decentralization can impact whether local governments actually allow for meaningful 
consultations with corporations and local governments.  For example, the forestry sector is one 
of the few sectors in Bolivia that are under central government control (Anderson, et al., 2005; 
Leon, et al., 2012) which means that local peoples cannot pressure the local government to 
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appease their preferences.  This makes it more difficult and less accessible for indigenous 
communities to express their opinion and needs about extractive activities on their land.  Instead 
of going to local governments, they must address the national government through traveling to 
the capital and talking to national officials that may not understand the affected communities’ 
local needs. Although the New Forestry Law of 1996 in Bolivia put total control in the central 
government to manage what happens on the ground with local people and the corporation, after 
the election of Morales, the process of prior consultation has been implemented (Schilling- 
Vacaflor, 2014).  	  
2.2.3 Pro-Indigenous Ideology, Movements, and Meaningful Consultations 
In reference to how indigenous people are acknowledged in the constitutions, there are, 
indeed, differences between “plurinationalism” in Bolivia and in Ecuador. In Bolivia’s 
constitution, according to Wolffe (2012), “Bolivia has recognized the thirty-six languages 
spoken by the indigenous peoples of Bolivia as ‘official languages’ of the state” (Wolffe, 2012, 
11). Furthermore, “indigeneity” or “being indigenous” has become a part Bolivia’s national 
identity, especially in recent decades (Pastero, 2013). However, it seems that “being indigenous” 
in Bolivia is much more complex than it is in Ecuador or Brazil. 
 In Bolivia, being indigenous tends to cross over class and geographical lines. There is a 
large population in Bolivia of urban indigenous people who may see extractive projects as 
beneficial to them whereas indigenous people who reside in rural or traditional forested territory 
view extractive projects as negative (Pastero, 2013, 3). So many urban, poor, indigenous people 
may support Evo Morales’s “vivir bien” (live well) campaign because they believe that it 
benefits them economically. This, of course, complicates the mission of how to empower 
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indigenous people, as Morales’s campaign promised, since there is not a clear “indigenous 
problem” as indigenous people make up both the urban poor and residents of non-urban, 
traditional lands (Olsen-Nalum, 2012, 28). Even though it is mentioned above that some prior 
consultations leave indigenous people feeling as though they were ignored, the Bolivian 
government tries to compensate by giving economic benefits as with the Guarani case (Schilling-
Vacaflor, 2012, 12). 
After	  years	  of	  tension	  and	  conflict	  between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  Guarani,	  several	  Guarani	  groups	  came	  together	  to	  stage	  a	  peaceful	  protest	  in	  the	  Margarita	  gas	  field	  that	  blocked	  the	  entrance	  of	  food	  and	  supplies	  to	  the	  oil	  company’s	  workers	  (Olsen-­‐Nalum,	  2012,	  36).	  These	  protests	  gained	  media	  attention	  and	  the	  help	  of	  NGOs,	  European	  advocacy	  groups,	  and	  other	  independent	  organizations	  (	  Olse-­‐	  Nalum,	  2012,	  11).	  The	  most	  organized	  and	  inclusive	  groups	  had	  their	  needs	  met,	  whereas	  rival	  and	  disorganized	  groups	  tended	  to	  not	  be	  successful	  in	  gaining	  reparations	  or	  consultations	  with	  corporations	  (Schilling-­‐Vacaflor,	  2014).	  	  
Meaningful consultations in Bolivia have to be led by the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and 
Energy (MHE); even though the average of consultation lasts around 13 weeks, consultations can 
last anywhere from one to thirty-five weeks depending on the case (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2014, 7). 
“Culturally competent” consultations would be held in both Spanish and the indigenous language 
of the affected indigenous group. The process is then followed by several meetings to exchange 
and discuss information, the details of the extraction project, and its impact on the environment 
and the indigenous community. Even though some prior consultations have been held in Bolivia, 
they have not always come out in favor of what indigenous communities hoped for.  Schilling-
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Vacaflor (2014) states that Nelly Romero, vice president of the Confederation of Indigenous 
Peoples from Bolivia’s Orient considers the consultations to be unhelpful: 
There was no consultations that actually changed a project, they only want to legitimize 
what had already been decided… they bring geophysics, environmentalists and a lot of 
specialized equipment…We are at a disadvantage, we do not have enough arguments to 
say that certain seismic lines or routes of gas ducts should be changed…(Schilling-
Vacaflor, 2014, 8). 
 
Besides indigenous groups being at an economic and informal disadvantage as mentioned above, 
internal cohesion among the indigenous group can impact the effectiveness of making their case 
for or against the extraction project (Schiling-Vacaflor, 2014, 14).  Schilliing-Vacaflor also says 
the consultation process tends to be costly and lengthy and thus, not in the national government’s 
best interest ( Schilling-Vacaflor, 2014, 15). Furthermore, interviews done in the article reveal 
that the MHE staff and the corporations believe that indigenous communities’ authority over the 
final agreement of the consultation should come secondary. Schilling-Vacaflor quotes a 
managing staff member of the oil company, REPSOL, who believes that indigenous people 
should not have that last say, or authority over the result of consultations: 
Consultation only means the right to be informed. When a project of national interest is at 
stake that will benefit the whole society, they (the indigenous peoples) cannot oppose 
it…Actually, I should not ask the indigenous authority or whoever for his permission, as 
the subsoil belongs to the state (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2014, 13).  
Gail Whiteman (2009) also argues that many indigenous groups feel that their voices are not 
heard during the consultation processes. Whiteman defines meaningful consultation as a 
“discursive space where organizations and individuals actually shape political situations” (108). 
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Based on these definitions of meaningful consultations, it appears that many of the extractive 
corporations and states ignore indigenous demands and do not act to change extraction plans 
based on the demands of indigenous communities.  
Even though both Ecuador and Bolivia consider themselves plurinational states that have 
signed the ILO 169 agreement, there have nonetheless been cases in which indigenous peoples 
have claimed that extractive projects by corporations and the state have ignored their land rights 
and demands. One difference between the outcomes of the lack of meaningful consultations is 
that the literature points to there being fewer violent conflicts between the state and corporations 
in Bolivia versus more violent conflict in Ecuador. Ideology and methods of compromise and 
leadership maybe able to point to the reasons behind these outcomes. 	  
2.2.4 Economic Autonomy Bolivia’s	  economic	  autonomy	  score	  is	  recently	  95.7	  %,	  which	  means	  that	  they	  have	  high	  economic	  autonomy	  	  (their	  World	  Bank	  measure	  was	  4.3%	  of	  the	  total	  debt	  service).	  This	  can	  explain	  how	  Bolivia’s	  government	  is	  more	  capable	  of	  holding	  meaningful	  consultations	  without	  the	  pressure	  of	  external	  actors.	  During	  Evo	  Morales’s	  presidential	  campaign,	  and	  even	  into	  his	  presidency,	  he	  has	  continued	  to	  be	  against	  free	  trade	  agreements,	  has	  supported	  the	  economic	  autonomy	  of	  Bolivia,	  and	  is	  said	  to	  support	  “indigenous	  interests”	  like	  cultural	  autonomy,	  bilingual	  education,	  economic	  empowerment,	  or	  even	  geographic	  isolation	  (Gustafson,	  2009;	  Levin	  and	  Molina,	  2011).	  Furthermore,	  after	  Morales’s	  ascendance	  to	  presidency,	  he	  nationalized	  the	  hydrocarbon	  sectors	  and	  renegotiated	  contracts	  with	  companies	  operating	  in	  oil	  and	  gas	  to	  give	  Bolivia	  more	  control	  over	  oil	  resources	  and	  what	  happens	  to	  those	  resources	  (Lehoucq,	  2008).	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However,	  there	  are	  doubt	  and	  accusations	  that	  Morales	  has	  betrayed	  his	  campaign	  promises.	  It	  has	  apparently	  been	  difficult	  to	  break	  away	  from	  the	  extractive	  industries	  to	  find	  alternative	  ways	  to	  trade	  as	  Bolivia’s	  economy	  has	  always	  depended	  on	  resource	  extractive	  operations	  (Olsen-­‐Nalum,	  2012,	  27).	  	  Despite	  Bolivia’s	  dependence	  on	  a	  gas	  and	  oil	  extraction,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  gas	  sectors	  are	  nationalized	  under	  a	  pro-­‐indigenous	  government,	  leads	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  consultations	  with	  indigenous	  citizens.	  
2.2.5 Conclusion Bolivia’s	  treatment	  of	  prior	  consultations	  is	  unique	  in	  the	  aspect	  that	  indigenous	  people	  make	  up	  the	  majority	  in	  national	  population	  and	  this	  can	  complicate	  distinguishing	  between	  “indigenous	  problems”	  versus	  “non-­‐indigenous	  problems.”	  In	  Bolivia,	  gas	  and	  oil	  extraction	  have	  continued	  to	  be	  major	  sources	  of	  state	  revenue	  and	  have	  presented	  difficulties	  in	  finding	  alternatives.	  Consequently,	  indigenous	  communities	  have	  mobilized	  for	  and	  demanded	  their	  right	  to	  prior	  consultation.	  Bolivia’s	  political	  and	  fiscal	  decentralization	  reforms	  in	  the	  1990s	  allowed	  for	  more	  indigenous	  officials	  to	  run	  for	  local	  office	  and	  encourage	  indigenous	  communities	  to	  vote	  on	  policies	  such	  as	  land	  reform	  but	  because	  the	  central	  government	  has	  total	  control	  over	  the	  use	  of	  natural	  resources,	  indigenous	  people	  and	  their	  local	  governments	  are	  limited	  to	  preventing	  the	  violation	  of	  their	  land	  rights	  by	  MNCs	  or	  governmental	  resource	  extraction	  projects.	  When	  protesting,	  the	  Guarani	  received	  support	  from	  NGOs	  and	  international	  institutions	  like	  the	  World	  Bank	  that	  pressured	  the	  government	  to	  obey	  indigenous	  groups’	  constitutional	  rights	  to	  prior	  consultations	  and	  for	  compensation	  of	  damages	  from	  resource	  extraction.	  Even	  though	  there	  still	  continues	  to	  be	  concerns	  over	  the	  quality	  of	  meaningful	  prior	  consultations,	  Bolivia	  is	  the	  only	  country	  of	  the	  three	  cases	  that	  attempts	  to	  have	  the	  prior	  consultations	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in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  High	  economic	  autonomy	  and	  pro-­‐indigenous	  ideology	  have	  led	  to	  Bolivia’s	  upholding	  of	  this	  right	  despite	  the	  challenges	  that	  arose	  during	  the	  consultation	  process.	  	  However,	  Bolivia’s	  case	  can	  only	  be	  categorized	  as	  partially	  successful	  because	  even	  though	  it	  holds	  consultations,	  the	  consultations	  are	  not	  necessarily	  meaningful	  or	  satisfactory	  to	  affected	  indigenous	  groups.	  
	  
2.3 Brazil 
2.3.1 Problem 	  	   The	  Belo	  Monte	  Hydroelectric	  Dam	  was	  originally	  designed	  in	  1980	  and	  was	  planned	  to	  be	  completed	  by	  2010.	  Brazilian	  government	  companies	  like	  Eletrobras	  (Brazilian	  Electrical	  Centers),	  Ministry	  of	  Mines	  and	  Energy,	  and	  Electronorte	  (Electrical	  	  Centers	  of	  North	  Brazil)	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  this	  dam	  to	  divert	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  water	  of	  the	  Xingu	  river	  through	  a	  series	  of	  canals	  and	  	  (Fearnside,	  2006,	  3).	  There	  are	  also	  international	  contributors	  that	  are	  pressuring	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  dam	  like	  alumina	  processing	  plants	  in	  China	  (Fearnside,	  2006,	  4).	  	  	  
	  	  Even	  though	  the	  dam	  is	  one	  of	  297	  dams	  that	  were	  originally	  planned	  to	  be	  built	  by	  2010,	  parts	  of	  the	  dam	  have	  been	  built	  but	  have	  not	  been	  fully	  completed	  (Irigaray,	  2014).	  There	  was	  such	  a	  push	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  dam	  because	  of	  the	  blackouts	  that	  happened	  in	  2001	  and	  the	  history	  of	  inefficient	  use	  of	  energy	  in	  Brazil	  (8).	  However,	  despite	  the	  pressure	  to	  build	  Belo	  Monte,	  the	  negative	  impacts	  outweigh	  the	  benefits.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  the	  main	  use	  of	  the	  electricity	  of	  the	  dam	  would	  only	  benefit	  aluminum	  smelting	  of	  which	  a	  large	  quantity	  of	  Brazil’s	  aluminum	  is	  exported	  (Irigaray,	  2014,	  9).	  	  
 44  
The	  dam	  threatens	  the	  health	  and	  livelihoods	  of	  indigenous	  people	  that	  live	  near	  the	  Xingu	  river	  because	  of	  possible	  flooding	  and	  pollution.	  If	  the	  dam	  were	  to	  be	  built,	  it	  would	  affect	  at	  least	  37	  indigenous	  ethnicities.	  	  Brazil’s	  1988	  constitution	  protects	  indigenous	  peoples	  through	  requiring	  a	  vote	  by	  the	  National	  Congress	  that	  would	  also	  allow	  public	  discussion	  on	  the	  issue	  (Irigaray,	  2014,	  3).	  However,	  in	  July	  2005,	  the	  National	  Congress	  quickly	  approved	  Belo	  Monte’s	  construction	  without	  any	  debate,	  public	  discussion,	  nor	  any	  enforcement	  of	  prior	  consultation.	  There	  have	  been	  protests	  by	  NGOs	  and	  indigenous	  groups	  like	  the	  Caiapó	  who	  have	  organized	  multi-­‐tribe	  protests	  against	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  dams	  along	  with	  the	  support	  of	  NGOs	  like	  Cultural	  Survival,	  the	  Missionary	  Indigenous	  Council,	  Comissão	  Pró-­‐Índio	  de	  São	  Paulo,	  etc.	  (	  Irigaray,	  2014,	  4).	  
	  Even	  though	  the	  plans	  of	  enabling	  the	  dam’s	  full	  operation	  have	  been	  delayed,	  the	  partial	  operation	  of	  the	  dam	  is	  currently	  underway	  and	  has	  already	  caused	  social	  and	  environmental	  damage	  (Irigaray,	  2014).	  According	  to	  Maria	  Irigaray	  of	  Amazon	  Watch,	  the	  construction	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  dam	  has	  led	  to	  increased	  rates	  of	  alcoholism,	  cultural	  disintegration,	  deaths	  and	  injuries	  caused	  by	  conflicts	  with	  migrant	  workers,	  etc.	  (Irigaray,	  2014,	  129).	  This	  case	  is	  an	  example	  of	  failure	  of	  Brazil’s	  government	  to	  conduct	  meaningful	  prior	  consultation	  with	  indigenous	  people.	  The	  next	  few	  sections	  look	  at	  the	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  this	  conclusion.	  
	  
2.3.2 Decentralization 
Brazil is broken down into 26 states, which are further divided into 5,560 municipalities 
(localdemocracy.net). In spite of such decentralized power, Brazil’s federalist government has 
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historically been weak and unable to effectively coordinate across state borders (Samuels, 2002, 
47). Also, indigenous groups may not necessarily benefit from these decentralization policies. 
For example, there exist some limitations for indigenous participation in Brazil’s compulsory 
voting law.   In order to vote, one must know how to speak Portuguese, and indigenous 
communities are not required to vote in if voting  goes against traditions 
(pib.socioambiental.org).  These limitations then decrease the chances for indigenous people to 
elect a governor for their state and consequently, decreasing the chance for their votes to be 
counted.  
 A second reason why decentralization in Brazil is not beneficial to protecting for 
indigenous land violations is because in Brazil, indigenous territory is considered under the 
jurisdiction of the central government-making it even more difficult for indigenous communities 
to influence environmental policy related to indigenous lands (Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, 1997, http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Brazil-eng/chaper%206%20.htm). The 
following section will look further into the role of constitutional rights and state ideologies in 
indigenous land rights. 	  
2.3.3 Pro-Indigenous Ideology  
Even though Brazil is also a signatory of the ILO 169, there have been cases of violence 
and abuse of environmental protection and indigenous territorial rights laws. Brazil	  does	  not	  consider	  “indigenous”	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  national	  identity,	  nor	  does	  it	  consider	  itself	  plurinational	  as	  Bolivia	  and	  Ecuador	  do.	  In	  Brazil’s	  previous	  Civil	  Code,	  indigenous	  people	  were	  defined	  as	  “sivicolas”	  or	  “forest	  dwellers”	  that	  are	  “relatively	  incapacitated	  and	  are	  subjected	  to	  tutelage”	  (Pallemaerts,	  1986,	  378).	  This	  definition	  justifies	  the	  state’s	  actions	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in	  not	  consulting	  with	  indigenous	  groups	  when	  undergoing	  any	  extractive	  project.	  Furthermore,	  former	  president	  Cardoso	  ignored	  Decree	  22	  of	  the	  1988	  Brazilian	  Constitution	  which	  declared	  the	  demarcation	  of	  TIs	  (Terras	  Indigenas,	  Indigenous	  Lands)	  and	  created	  Decree	  1775	  which	  gives	  “states,	  municipalities,	  and	  individuals	  the	  right	  to	  contest	  any	  demarcation	  of	  indigenous	  lands	  until	  the	  land	  is	  fully	  registered.”	  	  Some	  believe	  that	  this	  allows	  the	  state	  to	  explore	  for	  exploitation	  opportunities	  and	  permits	  that	  state	  to	  take	  back	  any	  indigenous	  land	  for	  their	  use	  (Stocks,	  2005,	  92).	  	  
Indigenous	  groups	  fought	  back	  against	  the	  national	  government,	  wanting	  to	  gain	  political	  access	  and	  rights	  to	  meaningful	  consultations.	  The	  Catholic	  Church’s	  National	  Conference	  of	  Brazil's	  Bishops	  (CNBB)	  was	  helpful	  in	  helping	  to	  organize	  indigenous	  communities	  in	  into	  what	  is	  now	  called	  the	  Union	  of	  Indigenous	  Nations,	  which	  is	  an	  organization	  of	  various	  indigenous	  communities	  that	  come	  together	  to	  mobilize	  and	  exchange	  information	  about	  their	  political	  rights	  	  (culturalsurvival.org;	  Eversol,	  2003).	  In 
March 2014, indigenous leader Sônia Guajajara brought to light at the 25th United Nations 
Human Rights Council that the Brazilian Government is constructing a dam on indigenous land, 
disregarding indigenous rights land laws (Amazon Watch, 2014, 
http://amazonwatch.org/news/2014/0311-indigenous-leader-condemns-brazils-rights-abuses-at-
united-nations). Because	  indigenous	  groups	  have	  generally	  been	  inclusive,	  i.e.	  organizing	  with	  indigenous	  communities	  of	  other	  ethnicities,	  this	  tactic	  has	  helped	  to	  build	  more	  support	  and	  importance	  to	  the	  issue,	  which	  has	  delayed	  the	  plans	  to	  begin	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  dam	  (Fearnside,	  2006).	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2.3.4 Economic Autonomy Like	  many	  of	  the	  other	  Latin	  American	  economies,	  Brazil	  liberalized	  its	  economy	  to	  recover	  from	  the	  losses	  caused	  by	  ISI.	  	  Later,	  in	  the	  1990s	  Brazil	  experienced	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  of	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  after	  the	  1980s	  debt	  crisis	  in	  commercial	  loans	  to	  help	  support	  the	  economy	  (Cardoso	  and	  Goldfajn,	  1997).	  Following	  Levine	  and	  Molina’s	  current	  measure,	  Brazil	  is	  71.4%	  economically	  autonomous.	  This	  means	  that	  Brazil,	  though	  moderately	  autonomous,	  has	  the	  least	  economic	  autonomy	  of	  the	  three	  cases.	  Brazil’s	  economic	  autonomy	  is	  also	  being	  affected	  by	  the	  pressures	  of	  international	  companies	  to	  extract	  and	  export	  their	  natural	  resources,	  which	  has	  shown	  to	  shorten	  the	  length	  of	  time	  that	  the	  National	  Congress	  of	  Brazil	  must	  take	  to	  vote	  and	  discuss	  on	  the	  decision.	  
2.3.5 Conclusion Brazil’s	  lack	  of	  enforcement	  of	  meaningful	  consultations	  for	  indigenous	  people	  stems	  from	  its	  moderately	  low	  economic	  autonomy	  (in	  comparison	  to	  Ecuador	  and	  Bolivia)	  and	  lack	  of	  pro-­‐indigenous	  ideology.	  The	  Belo	  Monte	  Hydroelectric	  Dam	  is	  currently	  being	  built	  with	  no	  regard	  to	  indigenous	  communities.	  Despite	  non-­‐violent	  protests	  and	  the	  cohesiveness	  of	  indigenous	  groups,	  this	  has	  not	  been	  enough	  to	  completely	  cease	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  dam.	  It	  is	  also	  difficult	  for	  indigenous	  groups	  to	  effect	  environmental	  policy	  because	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  not	  speaking	  Portuguese	  and	  having	  low	  participation	  rates.	  	  Indigenous	  communities’	  right	  to	  prior	  meaningful	  consultation	  has	  continued	  to	  be	  ignored	  since	  parts	  of	  the	  dam	  have	  been	  constructed	  and	  are	  operating.	  Therefore,	  this	  case	  is	  an	  example	  of	  state	  failure	  to	  enforce	  indigenous	  people’s	  right	  to	  prior,	  meaningful	  consultations.	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3 DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH  In	  each	  of	  these	  countries	  I	  examined	  how	  economic	  autonomy,	  pro-­‐indigenous	  ideology,	  and	  indigenous	  strength	  interplay	  to	  affect	  the	  likelihood	  of	  meaningful	  consultation.	  In	  what	  I	  observed	  in	  all	  three	  cases	  was	  that	  the	  decentralization	  reforms	  have	  not	  helped	  indigenous	  people	  control	  environmental	  policies	  because	  the	  countries’	  constitutions	  have	  given	  power	  to	  the	  central	  government	  to	  utilize	  and	  extract	  natural	  resources	  on	  indigenous	  lands	  when	  ever	  they	  want	  to.	  	  
	   Relatedly,	  the	  cases	  have	  shown	  that	  strong	  indigenous	  movements	  and	  protests	  have	  risen	  in	  all	  three	  countries.	  In	  Ecuador,	  the	  protests	  involved	  various	  indigenous	  and	  non-­‐indigenous	  groups	  and	  has	  even	  reached	  the	  international	  audience.	  NGOs	  have	  stepped	  in	  for	  logistical	  and	  technological	  support.	  In	  Brazil,	  despite	  various	  indigenous	  groups	  that	  have	  worked	  together	  to	  postpone	  plans	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  hydroelectric	  dams	  in	  the	  Amazon,	  construction	  of	  parts	  of	  the	  dam	  has	  already	  been	  underway	  on	  indigenous	  land.	  This	  case	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  government	  that	  failed	  to	  consult	  with	  indigenous	  people	  prior	  to	  this	  project.	  	  
For	  Ecuador,	  because	  President	  Correa	  has	  decided	  to	  continue	  with	  his	  plans	  to	  drill	  for	  oil	  in	  the	  Yasuní	  without	  consulting	  with	  indigenous	  people	  first,	  this	  case	  is	  also	  an	  example	  of	  a	  country’s	  failure	  to	  obey	  the	  ILO	  169’s	  law	  requiring	  prior	  consultation	  with	  indigenous	  peoples.	  Reasons	  for	  this	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  three	  factors:	  	  (1)	  Ecuador’s	  shift	  from	  being	  pro-­‐indigenous	  to	  less	  focused	  on	  indigenous	  rights,	  and	  (2)	  economic	  dependency	  on	  loans	  from	  China.	  This	  case	  is	  an	  example	  of	  failure	  to	  carry	  out	  consultations	  with	  indigenous	  people.	  Similarly,	  in	  Brazil,	  consultations	  were	  not	  carried	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out	  with	  indigenous	  groups	  despite	  the	  postponing	  of	  the	  plans	  for	  the	  dam.	  In	  this	  study,	  the	  reason	  that	  the	  dam	  construction	  was	  postponed	  points	  only	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  indigenous	  protests	  as	  they	  were	  inclusive,	  organized,	  and	  achieved	  support	  from	  INGOs.	  
For	  Bolivia,	  though	  there	  is	  an	  indigenous	  majority	  and	  an	  obvious	  push	  for	  respecting	  indigenous	  communities’	  right	  to	  meaningful,	  prior	  consultation,	  the	  issue	  is	  ironically	  complicated	  for	  just	  that	  reason-­‐	  there	  is	  an	  indigenous	  majority	  in	  which	  being	  indigenous	  does	  not	  primarily	  mean	  living	  on	  traditional	  lands.	  People	  who	  identify	  as	  indigenous	  work	  and	  live	  in	  both	  cities	  and	  in	  rural	  areas	  and	  may	  interpret	  Morales’s	  campaign	  message	  as	  not	  necessarily	  maintaining	  traditional	  lands,	  but	  it	  could	  mean	  job	  security	  in	  the	  city.	  So	  much	  of	  this	  complexity	  of	  “what	  is	  indigenous”	  in	  Bolivia	  has	  even	  led	  to	  some	  lack	  of	  cooperation	  and	  division	  in	  the	  Guarani-­‐Margarita	  case.	  Before	  the	  actual	  implementation	  of	  consultations	  with	  indigenous	  groups,	  the	  different	  Guarani	  groups	  came	  together	  and	  protested	  and	  helped	  to	  enforce	  meaningful	  consultations.	  Consultations	  have	  been	  carried	  out,	  but	  there	  continue	  to	  be	  drawbacks	  and	  contestations	  about	  the	  appropriate	  amount	  of	  time	  of	  the	  consultation	  process	  and	  over	  compensation	  of	  damages.	  This	  case	  for	  this	  study	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  partially	  successful	  case	  because	  consultation	  processes	  are	  underway	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  support	  of	  decentralization	  reforms,	  pro-­‐indigenous	  ideology,	  and	  successful	  indigenous	  movements.	  
Based	  on	  this	  research,	  economic	  autonomy	  is	  indicated	  to	  be	  positively	  correlated	  with	  the	  outcomes	  of	  having	  consultations.	  Brazil	  and	  Ecuador	  have	  lower	  economic	  autonomy	  levels	  in	  comparison	  to	  Bolivia	  using	  Levine	  and	  Molina’s	  measure.	  In	  both	  cases	  in	  Ecuador	  and	  Brazil,	  there	  were	  no	  consultations	  held,	  whereas	  in	  Bolivia	  consultations	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were	  held.	  Because	  of	  Bolivia’s	  low	  receipt	  IMF	  loans	  and	  because	  of	  the	  nationalization	  of	  gas	  companies	  in	  Bolivia,	  the	  central	  government	  has	  less	  pressure	  from	  outside	  lenders	  to	  dictate	  how	  to	  respond	  and	  work	  with	  indigenous	  groups	  (see	  appendix).	  	  
4 CONCLUSION 
  The current situation in Latin America is reflective of the dilemma many in the social 
sciences observe after a state democratizes: the struggle to connect the gap between economic 
development and indigenous rights. Latin American governments have a lot of new demands. 
The attempt to improve their economies in the 1980s and ‘90s severely backlashed and led to 
heightened poverty, social conflict, and land rights abuse by natural resource extraction project 
by both national government and MNCs. In my study, I looked at cases in Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Brazil.  This study evaluated the factors of decentralization, pro-indigenous ideology, and 
indigenous strength and their influence on the likelihood of a government’s enforcement of 
indigenous rights to meaningful, prior consultation.   
                  Even though Ecuador, Bolivia, and Brazil are decentralized,  the central governments 
of these states control environmental matters and leave subnational governments and indigenous 
citizens with no control of what happens to indigenous land. Pro-indigenous ideology assisted in 
justifying a government’s rationale in supporting indigenous peoples’ rights to prior, meaningful 
consultation. Even if prior consultations and plurinationalism are written in the constitution, the 
government’s actions in enforcing prior consultation are evidence that it is pro-indigenous.  
Indigenous protests were useful in bringing national and international attention, but, in Brazil 
and Ecuador, the protests were not effective enough in pressuring the countries’ governments to 
hold prior consultations. In Bolivia, the Guarani protests were enough to produce prior 
consultations. 
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Lastly, economic autonomy, is influential in impacting government behaviors.  It is the 
causal mechanism to the responses and treatment of indigenous people in these three countries 
and not an indicator of other causal factors such as pro-indigeneity or strong indigenous groups 
because economic autonomy allows for the state to define its own reaction to indigenous land 
dispute without worrying about what it needs to fulfill loan agreements. As observed in Ecuador 
and Brazil, both states were signatories of the ILO 169, both states also showed evidence of 
strong indigenous groups. However, because Ecuador and Brazil had more external loan 
agreements (as indicated by their economic autonomy score), the governments had to put more 
priority on meeting and paying back loan agreement. 
 Bolivia’s economic score is the highest among the three cases and showed to be a reason 
for the government to not feel as much external pressure like Ecuador and Brazil that had lower 
economic autonomy scores. Going forward, the measure of economic autonomy only included 
loans received from the IMF and not from other sources. So the measure of economic autonomy 
could be lower than what the measure of Levine and Molina provides. For this research, this 
measure does give a look at where the countries generally stand in their economic autonomy 
level.  Lower economic autonomy level demonstrated to be the direct cause of the governments’ 
ignoring of prior, meaningful consultations in Brazil and Ecuador. .Even though there continue 
to be challenges in Bolivia with the quality of prior consultations, their pro-indigenous ideology 
and relatively high economic autonomy make them more likely to hold prior consultations. This 
study, as mentioned, is important and unique, and even the first of it kind, because it allows the 
understanding and even prediction of the likelihood of how the central governments of these 
countries will react. It allows the identification of whether central governments will follow 
through with their responsibility to hold meaningful consultations to prevent violations of 
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indigenous rights, environmental damage, and help create a middle way between development 
goals and respect for the vivir bien concept and indigenous land rights.  
 
Figure 2 Economic Autonomy 
This graph illustrates the levels of economic autonomy per state. Bolivia has the highest level 
(the y axis shows the economic autonomy score for each state), Ecuador is the second highest, 
and Brazil’s economic autonomy score is moderate. Data for this graph came from the World 
Bank’s Indicators of total debt service which is plugged in to Levine and Molina’s economic 
autonomy measure 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.TDS.DECT.EX.ZS?page=2).  A state has high economic 
autonomy when they score between 80-100 percent. A state is moderately autonomous at 59 to 
79 percent (where Brazil’s score falls). 38-58 percent is low autonomy and 0-37 percent is no 
autonomy. However, the data taken from the World Bank is limited because it only includes 
loans taken from the International Monetary Fund and excludes loans and trade agreements from 
other sources. For example, exporting oil to China makes up a majority of Ecuador’s external 
financing according to Amazon Watch. This fact means that Ecuador’s economic autonomy 
score could be lower. 
 
 
 
Table 3 Indiginous Strengths 
This table compares indigenous strength is all three cases. In all of the cases, the effected 
indigenous groups demonstrated inclusivity by working with indigenous people outside their 
ethnic group and non-indigenous people. These groups also led organized, peaceful protests and 
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gained international support from INGOs, supporters from other countries, and international 
government organizations like the World Bank. 
 Bolivia 
 
Ecuador Brazil 
Fragmentation    
 
Inclusivity √ √ √ 
 
Peaceful Protests √ √ √ 
 
INGO Support √ √ √ 
 
International 
Awareness 
√ √ √ 
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